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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II (UNAVEM II)

(For the period 31 May 1991-25 October 1991)

Introduction

1. On 30 May 1991, the Security Council adopted resolution 696 (1991), the operative part of which reads as follows:

> "1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General 1/ and the addendum 2/ and the recommendations therein;
>
> "2. Decides accordingly to entrust a new mandate to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (henceforth UNAVEM II) as proposed by the Secretary-General in line with the "Acordos de Paz para Angola", and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to this effect;
>
> "3. Also decides to establish UNAVEM II for a period of 17 months from the date of adoption of the present resolution in order to accomplish the objectives stated in the report of the Secretary-General;
>
> "4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council immediately after the signature of the 'Acordos de Paz para Angola' and to keep the Council fully informed of further developments."

"1/ S/22627.

"2/ S/22627/Add.1.

2. The purpose of the present report is to provide the Security Council with an account of the activities during the first five months of UNAVEM II in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 696 (1991).

Mandate of UNAVEM II

3. It will be recalled that the mandate of UNAVEM II, in accordance with the Peace Accords for Angola (S/22609, enclosure), is:

(a) To verify the arrangements agreed by the two Angolan parties (the Government of Angola on the one hand and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) on the other) for monitoring the cease-fire, as set out in the Cease-fire Agreement (S/22609, attachment I), which forms part of the Peace Accords for Angola;

(b) To verify the arrangements agreed by the two Angolan parties for monitoring the Angolan police during the cease-fire period, as set out in section III of the Protocol of Estoril (S/22609, attachment IV), which forms part of the Peace Accords for Angola.

Verification tasks arising from the Peace Accords for Angola

4. It will further be recalled that the arrangements for the cease-fire are set out in detail in the Cease-fire Agreement which, together with its annexes and appendices, is the first of the four documents constituting the Peace Accords for Angola. The modalities for the verification and monitoring of the cease-fire are described in sections III and IV of that document and are amplified in its annex I. They may be summarized as follows:

(a) A Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM) has been formed, composed of representatives of the Government and of UNITA, as members, and of representatives of Portugal, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, as observers. A representative of the United Nations may be invited to participate in the meetings of CCPM. UNAVEM II has been invited to participate, as an observer, in the Political Commission of CCPM and its technical group on police matters;

(b) A Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (CMVF) has been formed with the same composition as CCPM, to which it reports. A representative of the United Nations is invited to its meetings;

(c) CMVF has established monitoring groups, which are subordinate to it, composed in equal numbers of representatives of the Government and of UNITA. They are unarmed;

(d) The monitoring groups are responsible for monitoring on the spot the observance of the cease-fire, including responsibility for preventing, verifying and investigating possible violations thereof;

(e) The monitoring groups have been organized in six regions and deployed on a full-time basis at each of the assembly areas where the troops of the two sides are being assembled. The monitoring groups have also been deployed at certain airports and border posts;

(f) The role of United Nations personnel, who have their own command structure, is to verify that the CMVF monitoring groups are assuming their responsibilities. This includes United Nations support in the investigation and resolution of alleged violations of the cease-fire. The security of the United Nations personnel, who are also unarmed, is the responsibility of the party that controls the zone where they are present.

5. In addition to the verification of the cease-fire, the Peace Accords also refer to a role for the United Nations in monitoring the Angolan police. The neutrality of the police, whose functions and activities are the Government's responsibility, is to be monitored by police monitoring teams composed of members designated by the Government and by UNITA, whose work is to be verified by police monitors of UNAVEM II. As reported in paragraphs 27 and 28 below, little progress has so far been achieved by the parties in establishing the police monitoring teams.

6. The mandate of UNAVEM II began on the date on which the cease-fire entered into force, namely 31 May 1991, and will last until the day following the completion of presidential and legislative elections in Angola, which the Peace Accords stipulate are to be held in the period between 1 September and 30 November 1992. The parties have reached an understanding to take into consideration the observers' proposal that the elections be held during the first part of the suggested period, preferably between 1 September and 1 October 1992.

I. Organization of the Mission

7. Brigadier-General Péricles Ferreira Gomes (Brazil) commanded UNAVEM II as Chief Military Observer from 31 May 1991, the date on which its mandate began, until 1 October 1991.

8. On 1 October 1991, Major-General Edward Ushie Unimna (Nigeria) took over command of UNAVEM II as Chief Military Observer.

9. A command group, chaired by the Chief Military Observer and comprising also the Deputy Chief Military Observer, the Chief of Staff and Operations, the Senior Political Adviser, and the Chief Administrative Officer, has been established to assist the Chief Military Observer in the exercise of his command.

10. On 25 October 1991, UNAVEM II comprised the following personnel:

Military observers	350
Military medical personnel	14
Police monitors	89
International civilian staff	54
Local civilian staff	41
Total	548

11. The United Nations Military Observers have been contributed by the following 24 Member States: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Congo, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Ireland, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe.

12. The police monitors have been contributed by the following nine Member States: Argentina, Brazil, Ireland, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Sweden and Zimbabwe.

13. UNAVEM II is also currently equipped with a civilian air unit consisting of one fixed-wing cargo aircraft and 12 utility helicopters. In addition, UNAVEM hires, whenever necessary, a heavy cargo aircraft and a small passenger aircraft.

II. Deployment of UNAVEM II in the field

14. Angola, its infrastructure and its population have been ravaged by almost 31 years of war; about 70 per cent of the roads are unusable because of mines and/or their very poor condition; telephone and other communications are extremely limited; water, food and fuel supplies in many areas are scarce or non-existent. Many tropical diseases, including malaria, are prevalent throughout the country.

15. Immediately after the adoption of resolution 696 (1991), the Secretary-General took steps to implement the new mandate entrusted to UNAVEM II. Advance parties were deployed on 2 June 1991 to five of the six regional headquarters (S/22672, para. 2). Subsequently, the Chief Military Observer decided to phase the deployment of observer teams to regional headquarters, assembly areas and critical points over five stages. This was necessary for several reasons.

16. The military observers who were available in Angola following the termination of the UNAVEM I mandate were sufficient to carry out only a small part of the new mandate. In any case, reconnaissance had to be carried out at each of the 50 assembly areas and 12 critical points at which five-man and two-man teams of military observers were to be deployed respectively. Both parties were slow in establishing joint monitoring groups, deploying their troops to the assembly areas and granting UNAVEM authorization to conduct reconnaissance in those areas, many of which were subsequently changed to other locations. The delay in the approval of the Mission's budget, which did not take place until two-and-a-half months after the Security Council's decision to establish UNAVEM II, and the consequent shortfalls in logistics support for it, also made it practically impossible to occupy all the assembly areas simultaneously.

17. UNAVEM II's deployment in the field was completed at all assembly areas in use by the end of September 1991.

18. The five main deployment phases are described below:

(a) Phase I (2 June-9 July). Regional headquarters were deployed in five of the six regions: Huambo, Luanda, Lubango, Luena and Saurimo. The Government's forces (FAPLA) and those of UNITA (FALA) provided liaison officers who participated in the reconnaissance of some 20 other sites at which UNAVEM II was to be deployed. Accommodation, logistic resources, medical facilities and essential services were looked into at each location and found to be lacking in most of them;

(b) Phase II (10 July-23 July). The remaining regional headquarters was deployed at Mavinga. Five-man United Nations Military Observer teams were deployed at the following assembly areas: Banja (later Chingongo) (team temporarily located in Lobito); Namibe; Dinge and Necutu (later Chimbuande) (teams temporarily located in Cabinda); Soyo; M'banza Congo; Negage; Bie; Menonque; Malange. Reconnaissance was conducted at three further locations;

(c) Phase III (24 July-31 July). During this phase, little reconnaissance took place because FALA had not cleared movement by UNAVEM personnel into the assembly areas assigned to them in the Peace Accords. Five-man teams were deployed at the following assembly areas: Bungo (team temporarily located at Negage); Capanda; Cafunfo; Sambo (team temporarily located at Huambo); Matala; Cahama; Dondo. A two-man team and a UNAVEM Liaison Officer were also deployed to UNITA's headquarters at Jamba;

(d) Phase IV (1 August-4 September). At the beginning of August, UNAVEM II was notified of changes in the locations of various (mostly FALA) assembly areas. Nine areas were deleted from the list attached to the Peace Accords for Angola and eight others were added. On 9 August permission was finally received to conduct reconnaissance into FALA assembly areas. This led to an intense period of reconnaissance missions, by air and road, to 20 previously unvisited locations. Five-man teams were deployed at the following assembly areas during this phase: Cazombo; Chicala; Wako Kungo; Cambandua; Chipindo; Quilengues (temporarily located at Lubango); Bimbe; Chingongo; Kuemba. The first UNAVEM police monitors were also deployed during this phase, beginning on 26 August, to the following locations: Cabinda; Negage (for Uige); M'banza Congo; Huambo; Lobito; Bie; Namibe; Lubango; Menongue; Lucapa; Saurimo. Thus, at the end of this phase, UNAVEM II was deployed at 32 assembly areas, six of which were located with the six regional headquarters;

(e) Phase V (5 September-30 September). A further sequence of intense air and road reconnaissance missions was carried out in the early part of September. Five-man teams were deployed at the following assembly areas: Quilengues (from Lubango); Chingongo (from Lobito); Quela; Mussende; Cambandua; Bailundo; N'Gove; Sambo (from Huambo); Xa-Cassau (team withdrawn from Chimbuande); Nharea (team withdrawn from Chimbuande); Kindege; Chipindo; Muconda; Quibala; Mucuio; Quirima.

19. Thus, UNAVEM II had by 30 September 1991 completed its deployment at all 46 areas at which the forces of the two sides were assembling. This

discrepancy as regards the 50 assembly areas listed in the Peace Accords is due to the fact that two assembly areas are still under discussion or review by CMVF and the two planned for Dinge and Chimbuande in Cabinda have not so far been established because of serious security problems in that province. Police monitors were deployed to the following locations during phase V: Malange; Lucapa; Cabinda; Cahama; Caxito; Sumbe; Xangongo; Mavinga. These deployments ensured that, by the end of September 1991, all the 18 provincial capitals had a UNAVEM police presence. UNAVEM already has 89 policemen, although not all of them are deployed to outposts yet.

III. Logistics

20. Military observers and police monitors have been deployed, in some cases since 2 June 1991, with only the bare minimum of logistic support. Purchase of many major items, such as communications equipment, prefabricated housing and generators, had to be delayed because of the delay in the approval of the Mission's budget. As a result living accommodation in the field ranges from relatively comfortable prefabricated shelters to tents, war-ravaged buildings and grass huts, which give little protection against poisonous snakes, rats and insects. Water is another problem: in some sites water has to be carried from as far as 2 kilometres away; in one case it can be supplied only by air.

21. The absence of military engineer support for UNAVEM II has aggravated these problems. Attempts are being renewed to obtain such support from a Member State. The extreme shortage of food, water and fuel in almost all areas has increased the need for air support, with an unforeseen increase in aviation fuel costs. No substantial amount of general or technical material is available locally. UNAVEM accordingly depends almost entirely on purchases from outside the country, with resultant delays in delivery and high freight costs. The establishment of tolerable living conditions for UNAVEM personnel in the field and other unforeseen needs will require additional financial provision for the Mission and I will shortly present proposals in this regard to the General Assembly.

IV. Observance of the cease-fire and incidents

22. The cease-fire has in general been well respected by both sides since it took effect on 31 May 1991. Most of the incidents have been relatively minor. The following are some examples:

(a) Malange (northern region): on 7 August the local FAPLA Commander complained that he and the Governor of Malange had been stopped on a road by about 30 FALA soldiers and forced to return to Malange. At a subsequent CMVF meeting in Malange, FALA said the incident had resulted from a breakdown in communications. After a long discussion, it was agreed by the two sides that there should be free movement on all roads, in conformity with the Peace Accords, and that in future the police should control the roads;

(b) Cuito Cuanavale (south-eastern region): on 9 August a FALA colonel was stopped by FAPLA troops while en route from Cuito Cuanavale to Menongue. The matter was resolved by a UNAVEM team, which found that there had been a series of misunderstandings between FALA and FAPLA;

(c) Cuito Cuanavale (south-eastern region): on 3 September the UNAVEM Team Commander reported that the local FAPLA Commander was not providing adequate information about his assembly area and was restricting the UNAVEM team's movements. On 4 September, the matter was raised with the FAPLA Chief of Staff, who gave an assurance that freedom of movement for the Cuito Cuanavale UNAVEM team would be guaranteed from that day;

(d) Lucapa (north-eastern region): on 13 September after a United Nations helicopter and aircraft had just taken off, the airport at Lucapa was the target of small-arms fire. FAPLA stated that the attack had been carried out by ex-FAPLA soldiers who had become bandits;

(e) Lobito (central region): on 21 September police reported that about 200 UNITA supporters had occupied the residential house of the Police Department, which had earlier been the property of UNITA. The UNAVEM team and two police officers, with the CMVF monitoring group, went to the house. Arms and ammunition were moved from it to the central police station at Lobito. After negotiations, the crowd left peacefully. The house was closed and left empty.

23. One of the most serious incidents occurred at Malange (northern region) on 30 September when the body of a UNITA political officer, Colonel Pedro Macanga, was found by UNAVEM and FALA teams. The colonel's car had apparently been ambushed on the previous night. The colonel's driver and three bodyguards (two of them injured) were found and interviewed. The next day, on 1 October, senior FAPLA and FALA officers from CMVF held a meeting, attended by the local UNAVEM Team Commander, at which the tense situation in the district, resulting from the killing, was discussed. FALA said that the circumstances pointed to FAPLA responsibility, while FAPLA noted that the killing had been carried out in a recognized FALA area. With the support of UNAVEM, both sides finally agreed on the need for restraint and that the killing should not be allowed to jeopardize the peace process.

V. Confinement of FAPLA and FALA troops to assembly areas

24. According to the Peace Accords, the assembly of both sides' forces in the assembly areas was due to have been completed by 1 August 1991. Later this was rescheduled for 15 September 1991. However, more than two-and-a-half months after the initial date, on 22 October 1991, less than 60 per cent of the projected total of FAPLA and FALA troops were in the assembly areas. According to UNAVEM's count, a total of 95,634 troops (68,666 FAPLA and 26,968 FALA) were in 45 assembly areas (the 3 Cabinda assembly areas not yet being occupied), compared with the projected total strength for all assembly areas of 165,440 troops (115,640 FAPLA and 49,800 FALA).

25. The two sides have cited various reasons for this serious delay in implementing a key provision of the Peace Accords. The most important is their difficulty in providing the necessary logistic support for their forces in the assembly areas, many of which are, in accordance with the Peace Accords, located away from populated areas. They have also referred to their difficulty in transporting their forces to the assembly areas. In the case of FALA this has involved moving troops, often accompanied by their families, over long distances on foot; FAPLA, on the other hand, is an army which has, to an important extent, deployed its forces, with their heavy equipment, in towns and other fixed installations and has lacked the means of transport needed to move them to the assembly areas. Questions have also been raised about the figures originally given by the two sides for their total strengths and about the categories of forces as well as weapons that must be assembled in accordance with the Accords. UNAVEM II has expressed understanding of the two sides' difficulties but has nevertheless urged them to make every effort to complete the assembly of forces at the earliest possible date. Recent steps taken by the United Nations in this regard are described in paragraph 31 below.

26. Some of the above-described difficulties have also contributed to delay in the establishment by CMVF of the joint monitoring groups foreseen in the Peace Accords. Even where established, these groups have often had difficulty in organizing themselves to carry out the functions attributed to them under the Accords. While helping them, wherever possible, to overcome these difficulties, UNAVEM II has increasingly taken the initiative by itself monitoring some aspects of the Accords and both sides welcomed this. For instance, in early September 1991, with the agreement of both parties, UNAVEM II took the lead in instituting the regular counting of troops in all the occupied assembly areas. UNAVEM II was thus able to play a key role in producing impartial and clear figures, using its presence in all the areas and its communications to help to foster confidence between the two sides. Subsequently the Mission started regular counting of weapons in each of the assembly areas.

VI. Police monitoring

27. While UNAVEM police monitors are now deployed in all of Angola's 18 provinces, the failure of the two sides to establish the police monitoring teams foreseen in the Peace Accords has prevented the UNAVEM police monitors from carrying out the functions ascribed to them. Nevertheless, police monitoring of a kind has begun and is likely to become more important as the peace process moves forward. It has already become clear that it is essential for the police monitors, even more than the military observers, to be able to understand and speak Portuguese or to be provided with adequate interpreters. The availability of the latter in Angola is proving to be limited and it may therefore become necessary, in the light of experience, to make adjustments to the composition of the police component in UNAVEM II.

28. It has also become clear that there is a widely held misconception about the role of the UNAVEM police monitors and the joint monitoring groups whose activities it is their task to verify. UNAVEM is therefore taking steps to explain that neither it nor the joint monitoring groups have any executive responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, which continues to rest with the existing police forces. The role of the monitoring teams and of the UNAVEM police monitors is to verify that the existing police forces carry out their duties in a manner that is politically neutral and respects the human and political rights of individuals. This function will become particularly important as the election process gets under way.

VII. Elections

29. No decision has yet been taken by the Angolan authorities to request the United Nations to provide either technical assistance or electoral observers for the forthcoming elections (see S/22627, para. 9). There are, however, strong indications of a growing consensus in Angola that the United Nations should be involved. It has been explained to the Angolan authorities that the provision of election observers would require a further decision of the Security Council and that, given the extreme complexities of such an operation, it is important that any request for United Nations involvement should be received as quickly as possible, so that appropriate recommendations may be made to the Security Council in good time.

VIII. Observations

30. It is a great pleasure to be able to report to the Security Council that the cease-fire in Angola has now held for over five months. This is a result on which both sides are to be congratulated. It provides a sound basis for implementation of all the other provisions of the Peace Accords for Angola.

31. As reported above, the two sides have been less successful in complying with the Peace Accords' provisions relating to the assembly of troops. Two-and-a-half months after that process was supposed to be complete, barely 60 per cent of the troop numbers declared by both sides had been assembled in the assembly areas, a state of affairs which undermines confidence and, at worst, could imperil implementation of various other aspects of the Peace Accords. It nevertheless has to be recognized that the assembly and confinement of such large numbers of troops, often accompanied by their families, in the time scale provided in the Peace Accords has presented both sides with genuine logistical difficulties, especially in the provision of logistical support in the assembly areas. At the request of both sides, the United Nations has launched an emergency food programme whose effect will be to relieve shortages of food in the assembly areas while troops wait there before being demobilized or absorbed into the new Angolan Armed Forces in accordance with the Peace Accords. The United Nations has recently conveyed to the two sides some suggestions for overcoming the practical difficulties that have impeded the assembly process. I have urged both sides to give these

ideas serious consideration with a view to completing the assembly of their forces during the next two or three weeks. At the same time I raised with them the need for proper custody of weapons which, in many cases, are not properly controlled and guarded in the assembly areas.

32. Although it is not strictly within the mandate of UNAVEM II, I should like to underline the essential importance of the formation of the new Angolan Armed Forces as an integral part of the peace process. Not only will this create armed forces in which both sides can have full confidence; it will also permit the demobilization of those not chosen for the new armed forces and the closure of the assembly areas. It is obviously desirable that these should be closed as soon as possible in order to minimize the hardships for the troops involved and the costs to the international community of maintaining the necessary monitoring and verification machinery in so many different locations. It is also to be noted that, if demobilization is to succeed and contribute to the implementation of the peace accords, measures will need to be taken to reintegrate the demobilized troops into civilian life, measures for which the Angolan authorities may seek international help. Meanwhile, I am glad to be able to report that the plans for the formation of the new Angolan Armed Forces are proceeding on schedule, with the help of advisers from France, Portugal and the United Kingdom. I have urged on all concerned the need for the agreed schedule to be adhered to, notwithstanding the delays that have taken place in the assembly of troops.

33. As regards elections, I have recently had consultations with leading personalities from both sides about a possible role for the United Nations. I have explained to them that it seems to me important that, at least as a first step, the United Nations should be invited to provide technical assistance to those who will be responsible for planning and conduct the elections. This is a service that the United Nations has provided to a number of countries in recent years. It seems particularly appropriate in Angola, which will be holding its first democratic elections. As regards a possible role for the United Nations in observing the elections, this is a formidable prospect, given the devastated condition of Angola and the almost total lack of the infrastructure that will be necessary to support United Nations electoral observers. Should I receive a request from the Angolan authorities for the United Nations to observe the elections, I shall of course report immediately to the Security Council.

34. An essential condition for the successful implementation of the Peace accords for Angola is that the joint machinery set up by those accords should work effectively. The Chief Military Observer of UNAVEM II has regularly attended the meetings of CMVF, the body which is primarily concerned with the military aspects, and has been invited with increasing frequency to attend meetings of CCPM, the highest of the joint bodies. He has reported to me that relations between the representatives of the two sides in these bodies have remained excellent in spite of the existence of important points of difference between them, which on one occasion in early September led UNITA to suspend temporarily its participation in the joint bodies. Problems have also sometimes arisen when decisions by CCPM and CMVF have not been conveyed with

sufficient speed and clarity down the chain of command to the monitoring groups at the assembly areas in the field. The three observer delegations, from Portugal, the Soviet Union and the United States, will continue to have a key role to play in helping to resolve these and other difficulties which may in future arise in the working of CCPM and CMVF. They are assured of UNAVEM II's support.

35. In conclusion, I should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to Brigadier-General Péricles Ferreira Gomes, Chief Military Observer of UNAVEM II until 1 October 1991, and to his successor, Major-General Edward Ushie Unimna for the exemplary manner in which they have commanded UNAVEM II during this critical and formative phase of its mandate. Equal tribute is due to their military and civilian personnel who have, with great courage and determination, established the Mission throughout the length and breadth of Angola in conditions which in some cases are amongst the most difficult that have ever been faced by United Nations peace-keeping personnel. As indicated earlier in the present report, I believe it important that steps be taken urgently to improve the living conditions of the military observers in the worst areas and I shall accordingly be putting forward proposals to the General Assembly during its current session.


UNAVEM II DEPLOYMENT
CONGO
ZAIRE
ZAMBIA
NAMIBIA
BOTSWANA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Government troop (FAPLA) Assembly Area
UNITA troop (FALA) Assembly Area
Government (FAPLA) "Critical Point"
UNITA (FALA) "Critical Point"
UNAVEM II Headquarters
UNAVEM II Regional Headquarters
UNAVEM II internal boundary
UNAVEM II Military Observers are located in the Assembly Areas and "Critical Points" shown on the map, except Assembly Areas of Dinge and Chimbuande.
Dinge
Cabinda
Chimbuande
Noqui
M'banza Congo
Soyo
Quimbele
Nzeto
Kindege
Bungo
Negage
Quipedro
Marimba
LUANDA
Luanda
Cafunfo
Lucapa
Xa-Cassau
Quela
Cabo Ledo
Capanda
Malange
Dondo
Saurimo
Mussende
Quibala
Quirima
Muconda
Wako Kungo
Andulo
Nharea
Bimbe
Luena
Bailundo
Kuemba
Cazombo
Lobito
Chingongo
Bie/Cuito
Chicala
Huambo
Cambandua
Sambo
N'gove
Chipindo
Bentiaba
Lumbala-Nguimbo
Quilengues
Menongue
Lubango
Matala
Namibe
Mucuio
Cuito Cuanavale
Mavinga
Cahama
Xangongo
Licua
Jamba
Santa Clara
Mucusso
0 75 150 225 300
KILOMETRES
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OCTOBER 1991